In light of the rising demand for biometric-authentication systems, preventing face spoofing attacks is a critical issue for the safe deployment of face recognition systems. Here, we propose an efficient liveness detection algorithm that requires minimal hardware and only a small database, making it suitable for resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones. Utilizing one monocular visible light camera, the proposed algorithm takes two facial photos, one taken with a flash, the other without a flash. The proposed SpecDif f descriptor is constructed by leveraging two types of reflection: (i) specular reflections from the iris region that have a specific intensity distribution depending on liveness, and (ii) diffuse reflections from the entire face region that represents the 3D structure of a subject's face. Classifiers trained with SpecDif f descriptor outperforms other flash-based liveness detection algorithms on both an in-house database and on publicly available NUAA and Replay-Attack databases. Moreover, the proposed algorithm achieves comparable accuracy to that of an end-to-end, deep neural network classifier, while being approximately ten-times faster execution speed.
Introduction
A biometric authentication system has an advantage over a traditional password-based authentication system: it uses intrinsic features such as a face or fingerprint, so the user does not have to remember anything to be authenticated. Among the various biometric authentication systems, facerecognition-based ones take advantage of the huge variety of facial features across individuals, and thus have the potential to offer convenience and high security. Face authentication, however, has a major drawback common to other forms of biometric authentication: a nonzero probability of false rejection and false acceptance. While false rejection is less problematic, because a genuine user can usually make a second attempt to be authorized, false acceptance entails a higher security risk. When a false acceptance occurs, the system may actually be under an attack by a malicious imposter attempting to break into it. Acquiring facial images Face and eye regions are extracted from the two photos and resized, and the Speculum Descriptor (D spec ∈ R 3200 for each eye) and the Diffusion Descriptor (D diff ∈ R 10000 ) are calculated from these regions. Two example results obtained with real (left) and fake (right) faces are shown. Note that the actual region used to calculate D Spec is 40 × 40 pixels square region inside the iris centered on the pupil. (c) The two descriptors are vectorized and concatenated to build the SpecDif f descriptor, which is then classified by standard classifiers such as a support vector machine (SVM, [1] ) or a neural network. via social networks is now easier than ever, allowing attackers to execute a variety of attacks using printed photos or recorded video. The demand for technologies for detecting face spoofing (i.e., face liveness detection) is thus rising in an effort to ensure the security of sites deploying face recognition systems. Face recognition systems are being used at, for example, airports and office entrances and as login systems of edge devices. Each site has its own hardware availability; i.e., it may have access to a server that can perform computationally expensive calculations, or it may be equipped with infrared imaging devices. On the other hand, it may only have access to a low-performance CPU. It is thus natural that the suitable face liveness detection algorithm will differ according to the hardware availability. The advent of deep-learning technologies has allowed high-precision image processing that competes with human abilities at the expense of high computational cost. On the other hand, there is still a need for an efficient liveness detection algorithm that works with minimal computational resources. In this study, we focus on this case: liveness detection on a mobile phone equipped only with a CPU, without access to external servers.
In line the goal of developing liveness detection technology independent of hardware requirements, we decided to use one visible-light camera mounted on the front of the mobile device, and have devised an efficient, novel flash reflection-based face liveness detection algorithm. The algorithm leverages specular and diffuse reflections from the iris regions and the facial surface, respectively. An all-white, bright screen is used as a flash simulator, and two facial photos, taken with and without a flash, are used to calculate the Speculum Descriptor, D spec ∈ R 3200 and the Diffusion Descriptor, D diff ∈ R 10000 . Both descriptors are based on the difference between the two facial photos and are normalized by the luminance intensities such that the descriptor magnitude is bounded in the range [−1, 1], thereby facilitating the training of classifiers and improvement of their classification accuracy (Fig.2 ).
Testing on a small in-house database containing ≈ 1K image pairs per binary class (real or fake face), the proposed descriptor classified with a support vector machine (SVM) achieved the highest classification performance among other flash-based face liveness detection algorithms. Generalizability across different domains is verified by cross-database evaluation on NUAA and Replay-Attack databases; all classifiers are trained on the in-house database and tested on the two public databases. The results confirmed that the proposed algorithm not only outperforms other flash-based algorithms on the public databases but also achieves comparable or even better classification performance than that of a computationally expensive, end-to-end deep neural network that is ten times slower.
The proposed algorithm enables efficient, user-friendly, and accurate liveness detection. Its contributions are summarized below:
1. Minimal hardware requirements: a single visible-light camera and a flash light-emitting device.
2. Minimal computational requirements: implementable on mobile devices.
3. Minimal database requirements: trainable with merely ≈ 1K image pairs for both real and fake face classes.
4. Minimal data label requirements: no auxiliary supervision such as depth or segmentation is needed.
5. High detection accuracy, comparable to an end-to-end, deep neural network model, but with ten-times faster execution.
Related Work
The current liveness detection technologies aimed against spoofing attacks are summarized below. Face spoofing attacks can be subdivided into two major categories: 2D attacks and 3D attacks. The former includes print-attacks and videoreplay attacks, while the latter includes 3D spoofing mask attacks. Several publicly available face liveness databases simulate these attacks. To name a few, the NUAA [2] and PrintAttack [3] databases simulate photo attacks. The ReplayAttack [4] and CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing [5] datasets simulate replay attacks in addition to photo attacks. The 3D Mask Attack Database [6] and HKBU-Mask Attack with Real World Variations [7] simulate 3D mask attacks. Example countermeasures to each attack type are summarized below.
Countermeasures to 2D attacks
Because of the reflectance of printed media and the use of photo compression, printed photos have surface textures or patterns that differ from those of a real human face, and these textures can be used to detect print attacks. Replay attacks are conducted by playing video on displays such as monitors or screens, which also have surface properties different from those of a real face. Here, local binary pattern (LBP, [4, 8, 9] ), Gaussian filtering [10, 11] , and their variants can be used to detect 2D attacks. Infrared imaging can be used to counter replay attacks, because the display emits light only at visible wavelengths (i.e., a face does not appear in an infrared picture taken of a display whereas it appears in an image of an actual person [12] ). Another replay-attack-specific surface property is moiré pattern [13] .
A prominent feature of these 2D attacks is the flat, 2D structure of the spoofing media. Here, stereo vision [14] , depth measurement from defocusing [15] , and flash-based 3D measurements [16] [17] [18] [19] are effective countermeasures that detect flatness as a surrogate of 2D spoofing attacks. In this paper, we focus on using flash-based liveness detection to counter 2D attacks.
Some algorithms, including ours, construct descriptors from pictures taken with or without a flash. The following four are mono-colored-flash-based algorithms: (i) LBP_FI (LBP on the flash image), in which the LBP of a picture taken with a flash is used as a descriptor [16] ; (ii) SD_FIC (the standard deviation of face intensity change), in which the standard deviation of the difference between photos of the same subject taken with and without a flash is used as a descriptor [16] ; (iii) Face flashing, in which the descriptor is made from the relative reflectance between two different pixels in one photo taken with a flash, i.e., the reflectance of each facial pixel divided by that of a reflectance pixel (hereafter abbreviated as RelativeReflectance [17] ); (iv) implicit 3D features, where pixel-wise differences in pictures taken with and without a flash are calculated and divided by the pixel intensity of the picture without the flash on a pixel-by-pixel basis [18] . We compare these algorithms with ours in Result section.
Countermeasures to 3D mask attacks
The recent 3D reconstruction and printing technologies have given malicious users the ability to produce realistic spoofing masks [20] . One example countermeasure against such a 3D attack is multispectral imaging. Steiner et al. [21] have reported the effectiveness of short-wave infrared (SWIR) imaging for detecting masks. Another approach is remote photoplethysmography (rPPG), which calculates pulse rhythms from periodic changes in face color [22] .
In this paper, however, we do not consider 3D attacks because they are less likely due to the high cost of producing 3D masks. Our work focuses on preventing photo attacks and replay attacks.
End-to-end deep neural networks
The advent of deep learning has allowed researchers to construct an end-to-end classifier without having to design an explicit descriptor. Research on face liveness is no exception; that is, deep neural network-based countermeasures have been found for not only photo attacks but also replay and 3D mask attacks [23] [24] [25] . The Experiment section compares our algorithm's performance with that of a deep neural network-based, end-to-end classifier.
Proposed algorithm
We propose a liveness detection algorithm that uses both specular and diffuse reflection of flash light. The iris regions and the facial surface are used to compute the Speculum Descriptor, D spec , and the Diffusion Descriptor, D diff , respectively. The two descriptors are vectorized and concatenated to build the SpecDif f descriptor, which can be classified as a real or fake face by using a standard classifier such as SVM or a neural network.
The procedure is as follows. During and after the flash illumination, two RGB, three-channel photos are taken: P Before D spec and D diff are calculated, the following common preprocessing functions are applied to both P (f) and P (b) :
• Function F aceDetection: detect face location (F ace loc ) from each image.
• Function F eatExtraction: extract locations of facial feature points (F ace loc ) from each face.
• Function F aceCrop: crop the region of interest.
• Function GaussF ilter: apply Gaussian filter to increase position invariance.
• Function Resize: resize the region of interest.
For face detection and facial feature extraction, the LBPAdaBoost algorithm [26] and the supervised descent method [27] are used in combination. The parameters used for cropping, Gaussian filtration, and resizing differ according to whether D spec or D diff is being calculated. The positions of the faces detected in the two photos, P
and P (b) , may potentially be different. However, because the flash duration is short and Gaussian filtration is applied, cropping the faces with two different binding boxes does not cause a major problem with face alignment. Unlike a printed photo or image shown on a display, the human iris shows specular reflection (due to its curved, glass beads-like structure) when light is flashed in front of it. Thus, if P (f) is from a real face, a white spot reflecting the flash appears, whereas in the case of a real P (b) , a white spot does not appear (Fig.3b) . On the other hand, if P (f) and P (b) are from a fake face, a white spot appears in neither of them, but if a flashed face is used as the spoof face, it appears in both of them (Fig.3c) . To utilize this difference as D spec , the iris regions are extracted from the cropped face according to F ace loc . The iris regions are defined as two square boxes centered on each eye, having an edge length that is one-third of the horizontal length of the eye (Fig.3a) . A Gaussian kernel with a two-pixel standard deviation is applied to each of the regions and then they are resized to 40 × 40 pixels. Hereafter, the extracted and resized iris regions from both eyes are denoted as
. Pixel intensities at the vertical location h, horizontal location w, and eye position s are denoted as i h,w,s , as follows:
Because i One potential weakness of D spec is its sensitivity to change in the position of the reflected-light spot. Depending on the relative position of the subject's face and direction of the flash, the position of the white-reflection spot inside the iris region changes. Although Gaussian filtering increases positional invariance, the variance of the spot position is much larger than the Gaussian-kernel width. Thus, to further increase positional invariance, the elements of the vectorized descriptor that are originated from each eye are sorted in ascending order to obtain D spec ∈ R 3200 as follows:
The steps for calculating D spec are summarized in the algorithm 1.
if (i Although it has been confirmed that D spec by itself can detect spoofing attacks, it has several pitfalls. Firstly, if a real subject is wearing glasses, the lens surface reflects the flash. The false-negative rate is increased when glasses-originated specular light contaminates the iris-originated specular light. Secondly, if a photo printed on a glossy paper is bent and used for an attack, there is a slight chance that the flash will reflect at the iris region of the printed photo, leading to increased false-negative rate. 
where I (f) ∈ R 100×100 and I (b) ∈ R 100×100 are face regions in photos P (f) and P (b) , cropped with rectangles circumscribing all F ace loc , filtered with a Gaussian kernel with a five-pixel standard deviation, and resized to 100 × 100 pixels. Here, S h,w ∈ [−1, 1] because I 
In light of the Lambertian model, we can understand why does D diff represent the 3D structure of a face. Moreover, the Lambertian model explains an additional advantage of D diff : color invariance (also see [18] ). This can be seen as follows: assuming that the entire face is a Lambertian surface (i.e., a uniform diffuser), the surface-luminance intensity depends on the radiant intensity per unit area in the direction of observation. Thus, the pixel intensity I h,w at the vertical position h and horizontal position w can be described as:
where L, K h,w , and θ h,w denote the light-source intensity, surface reflectance coefficient, and angle of incidence, respectively. As equation 5 indicates, the luminance intensity I h,w depends on the 3D structure of the facial surface that determines θ h,w . Additionally, I h,w depends on the surface reflectance K h,w . This means that differences in color of the surface (e.g., light skin vs. dark skin) affect the observed luminance intensity even under the same light intensity, L. The design of equation 3 solves color-dependency problem by canceling out the surface reflectance K h,w . Under the assumption of a Lambertian surface, the terms I 
where L (f) and L 
Equation 7 depends on θ and represents the 3D structure of the facial surface. Yet equation 7 is independent of the surface reflectance K, thereby avoiding the skin-color problem. Thus, although Lambertian reflections from the facial surface can be modeled as a function of the surface reflectance and surface 3D structure, equation 3 cancels K in order to confer color invariance as an additional advantage to D diff . Algorithm 2 lists the steps for calculating D diff .
Algorithm 2 Calculation of D diff .
Input:
if (I 
SpecDif f descriptor
The two descriptors are concatenated into the SpecDif f descriptor:
The 
Experiments

Models
The classification performances of the proposed descriptors are evaluated using mainly SVM, either with a linear or radial basis function (RBF) kernel (Fig.4a) . D spec , D diff , and SpecDif f are compared with four previously reported descriptors: SD_FIC (R, [16] ), LBP_FI (R 10000 , [16] ), RelativeReflectance (R 10000 , [17] ), and Implicit3D (R 10000 , [18] ). For SpecDif f , a neural network consisting of four fullyconnected (FC) layers is also tested as a classifier (Fig.4b) . The first three FC layers have 200, 100, and 50 hidden units, respectively, interleaved with a rectified linear unit (ReLU). The SpecDif f descriptor is resized to R 2500 before being used as an input to the first layer.
ResNet4 based on ResNet-version 2 [28] is constructed as an end-to-end deep neural network (Fig.4c) . ResNet4 takes as input a six-channel image that is constructed with two three-channel images I (f) and I (b) concatenated along the channel axis. I (f) and I (b) are facial images of 244 × 244 pixels, with and without a flash. The initial convolution is followed by one residual connection skipping the next two convolutions. After global average pooling, the FC layers classify the data into one of the two alternative classes.
All the analyses are conducted with customized scripts running on either MATLAB R2016b with an Intel® Core TM i7-4790 CPU@3.60GHz, or on python-TensorFlow1.4 with an NVIDIA GeForce GTX1080 or RTX2080 graphics card. SVM training is executed using the libsvm package [29] .
Databases
As of early 2019, there is no publicly available facial-image database of images taken with and without a flash. Therefore, we collected 1176 and 1660 photos of real and fake faces of 20 subjects, respectively. The photographing conditions in the real and fake categories are varied as follows: two lighting conditions (bright office area and dark corridor area), and three facial-accessory conditions (glasses, a surgical mask, or nothing). To make the fake photos, the real faces are printed on papers or projected on displays in order to simulate photo-or display-attacks (≈ 15% of the entire dataset is composed of display attacks). Leave-one-ID-out cross-validation is conducted using this in-house database, and the average equal error rate (EER) is calculated as an evaluation measure. The device used for the data collection is an iPhone7 (A1779). The display-attack devices are an iPad Pro (A1584) and ASUS ZenFone Go (ZB551KL).
To test the generalizability of the proposed method, a crossdatabase validation is conducted using two public databases, NUAA and Replay-Attack, which consist of 15 IDs / 12614 pictures and 50 IDs / 600 videos, respectively, simulating photo and display attacks. Due to the inaccessibility of the real subjects in the databases, only the false acceptance rate (FAR) is evaluated. The models are initially trained using all of the data in the in-house database, and then tested on NUAA and Replay-Attack databases.
To test vulnerability to the two attack types, the SpecDif f descriptor with the RBF-kernel SVM is tested separately against photo and replay attacks by using both the in-house database and the Replay-Attack database. Leave-one-ID-outcross-validation was performed on the in-house database. To compare accuracies by using FAR, we fix the false rejection rate (FRR) to 0.1 % and evaluated FAR. On the ReplayAttack database, FAR is calculated.
In each training epoch, 10 % of the available non-test data is randomly selected as validation data, on which hyperparameter optimization is conducted.
Speed test on actual mobile devices
To compare the execution speeds of our proposed algorithm and ResNet4, a deep-neural-network classifier, a custommade iOS application for liveness detection is built on Xcode 10.2.1 / MacBook Pro, written in Swift, C, and C . For Gaussian filtration, an OpenCV [30] built-in function is used. The app is then installed on an iPhone7 (A1779), iPhone XR (A2106), and iPad Pro (A1876) for the speed evaluation. Execution speed is measured during the preprocessing step and the descriptor calculation/classification step.
Results
Classification performance
A leave-one-ID-out cross-validation is conducted on the inhouse database to calculate the average EER. The results are summarized in Table1, with the best model is highlighted in bold. The average D spec and D diff calculated using the in-house database are shown in Fig.2a and b , respectively. The results of the cross-database test, conducted with the NUAA and the Replay-Attack databases, are summarized in Table 2 . Among all the descriptors-classifiers combination, the proposed SpecDif f descriptor with RBF kernel-SVM achieves the highest classification accuracy on average, on both the in-house database and on the two public databases. Moreover, its accuracy is comparable or even better than ResNet4, the end-to-end deep-neural-network classifier. The results of the evaluation by attack type are summarized in Table 3 . Although the display attack slightly increases FAR on the in-house database, the cross-database evaluation on the Replay-Attack database resulted in a low FAR on both photo and display attacks, confirming that the proposed approach is robust against changes in attack types.
Execution speed on mobile devices
The results of the speed evaluation of the proposed algorithm and deep neural network classifier on the iPhone7, iPhone XR and iPad Pro are summarized in Fig.5 . On all devices, the proposed algorithm is approximately ten-times faster in terms of the descriptor calculation/classification time than ResNet4.
Discussion
Liveness detection based on the SpecDif f descriptor achieves the highest classification performance among the flash-based algorithms tested. Moreover, its performance is comparable to that of more complex end-to-end deep-neuralnetwork, ResNet4. The RBF kernel-based SVM classifier has approximately 6.6 million floating operations (FLOPs), while ResNet4 has 7 giga-FLOPs (which is larger than the original ResNets due to the large input size, large channel size, and lack of an initial pooling layer). Accordingly, the proposed SpecDif f descriptor classified with RBF kernel-SVM is approximately ten times faster than the deep neural The proposed D spec is simple, yet it achieves competitive classification accuracy. One drawback is, however, that its accuracy is affected by the presence of eyewear. For example, sunglasses occluding the eye region make the liveness detection impossible. Even with transparent glasses, specular reflection on the lenses can potentially interfere with the descriptor. Because of this drawback, it is recommended to use D diff simultaneously with D spec . The combined SpecDif f descriptor achieved top-tier classification performance in all the evaluation schemes, indicating its robustness.
Both D diff and D spec are based on the difference between two photos, one taken with, the other without a flash, normalized by the pixel intensities of the two photos. Because of the normalization, the descriptors are bounded in the range [−1, 1], and the classification accuracy is better than those of unnormalized descriptors.
Both our original database and the Replay-Attack database contain display attacks, by which a photo or a video is played on an electronic display such as a smartphone or a tablet. Theoretically speaking, displays violate the assumption regarding D diff : equation 3 applies to a Lambertian surface, whereas displays not only diffuse light but also emit light by themselves, interfering with D diff . Despite the violation of this assumption, the classification performance of the proposed Table 3 : Evaluation on spoofing subcategories by using SpecDif f descriptor with SVM-RBF kernel classifier.
In-house database Replay-Attack FAR@FRR=0.1 (%) FAR(%) photo display photo display 0.88 2.66 0.34 0. 00 model on display attacks is comparable to its performance on photo attacks. This might have been because the subtraction in the numerator of equation 3 cancels out the display-emitted light. Although the emitted light increases the denominator, it decreases the overall descriptor magnitude (i.e., it "flattens" the descriptor) leading to correct classification of a face as a spoofing class rather than a real-face class. When implementing an algorithm for practical use, it is generally difficult to choose one best algorithm, because each algorithm has different hardware requirements. A deepneural-network model or high-resolution infrared-camerabased liveness detection are powerful algorithms, but they require computationally expensive processing units or specialized imaging devices. On the other hand, our proposed algorithm, with the SpecDif f descriptor classified with RBF kernel-SVM, is efficient yet effective, having minimal hardware and database requirements suitable for mobile devices, web cameras, and edge devices. 
Conclusion
By using specular and diffusion reflection from a subject's face, the proposed algorithm based on the SpecDif f descriptor achieved the best liveness detection accuracy among other flash-based algorithms at execution speed approximately tentimes faster than that of a deep neural network. The algorithm requires only one visible-light camera and a flash light. A small database containing ≈ 1K image pairs per class with binary labels is sufficient to train a classifier using the SpecDif f descriptor, enabling the easy and wide applica-tion of the liveness detection algorithm. Experiments conducted on the algorithm operating on actual devices confirms that it has a practical level of performance on mobile devices without the need for computationally expensive processing units.
